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The Impact of Building 
Restrictions on Housing
Affordability
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
chorus of voices appears to proclaim unanimously that
 America is in the midst of an affordable housing crisis. 
Housing and Urban Development Secretary Andrew Cuomo 
asserted the existence of such a crisis in his introduction to a 
March 2000 report that documents a continuing and growing 
housing affordability crisis throughout the nation. Indeed, 
Secretary Cuomo regularly justified aggressive requests for 
funding by pointing to this crisis. Advocacy groups for the poor 
such as the Housing Assistance Council pepper their 
documents with assertions that “the federal government 
should commit to a comprehensive strategy for combating the 
housing affordability crisis in rural America.” Trade 
associations such as the National Association of Home Builders 
decree that “America is facing a silent housing affordability 
crisis.” The National Association of Realtors agrees: “there is a 
continuing, growing crisis in housing affordability and 
homeownership that is gripping our nation.”
Does America actually face a housing affordability crisis? 
Are home prices high throughout the United States, or are 
there just a few places where housing prices become extreme? 
In those places that are expensive, why are home prices so high? 
Is subsidized construction a sensible approach to solving this 
problem—relative to other, deeper reforms? This paper 
examines whether America actually does face an affordable 
housing crisis, and why housing is expensive in high-price 
areas. 
In general, housing advocates have confused the role of 
housing prices with the role of poverty. Both housing costs and 
poverty matter for the well-being of American citizens, but 
only one of these factors is a housing issue per se. Certainly, the 
country should pursue sensible antipoverty policies, but if 
housing is not unusually expensive, these policies should not be 
put forward as a response to a housing crisis.1 To us, a housing 
affordability crisis means that housing is expensive relative to 
its fundamental costs of production—not that people are poor. 
Therefore, we will focus entirely on housing prices, not on the 
distribution of income.
A second key concept in thinking about a housing 
affordability crisis is the relevant benchmark for housing costs. 
Affordability advocates often argue for the ability to pay (for 
example, some percentage of income) as a relevant benchmark, 
but this again confuses poverty with housing prices. We believe 
that a more sensible benchmark is the physical construction 
costs of housing. If we believe that there is a housing crisis, then 
presumably the correct housing response would be to build 
more housing. Yet the social cost of that new housing can never 
be lower than the cost of construction. For there to be a “social” 
gain from new construction, housing must be priced 
appreciably above the cost of new construction.  
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This argument is not meant to deny that the existence of 
poor people who cannot afford housing is a major social 
problem. However, if housing does not cost appreciably more 
than new construction, then it is hard to understand why 
policies oriented toward housing supply would be the right 
response to this problem. Hence, we focus on the gap between 
housing costs and construction costs.
To look at the housing affordability issue, we use the R.S. 
Means Company’s data on construction costs in various U.S. 
metropolitan areas (hereafter, the Means data). These data give 
us information (based on the surveying of construction 
companies) on the costs of building homes with various 
characteristics. As a basic number, the Means data suggest that 
construction costs for the lowest of the four quality types they 
track (termed an economy home) are about $60 per square foot. 
Construction costs for the next highest quality type (termed an 
average home) are about $75 per square foot. Ultimately, we 
compare this information with data on housing prices. 
To get a better sense of the distribution of housing prices 
throughout the United States, we turn to the American 
Housing Survey (AHS), but for a quick look at the affordability 
issue, it is useful to examine the 2000 U.S. census. The census 
indicates that the self-reported median home value is 
$120,000.2 Sixty-three percent of single-family detached homes 
in America are valued at less than $150,000. Seventy-eight 
percent of these homes are valued at less than $200,000. The 
American Housing Survey reports that the median size of a 
detached owned home is 1,704 square feet. The construction 
costs of an average home imply that this home should cost 
about $127,500 to build, with a lower quality economy home 
costing $102,000 to construct.3 
Together, these numbers provide us with the first important 
lesson from housing markets. The majority of homes in this 
country are priced—even in the midst of a so-called housing 
affordability crisis—close to construction costs. The value of 
land generally seems modest, probably 20 percent or less of the 
value of the house. To us, this means that America as a whole 
may have a poverty crisis, but its housing prices are basically 
being tied down by the cost of new construction. Unless state 
intervention can miraculously produce houses at far less than 
normal construction costs, such programs are unlikely to 
reduce the distribution of housing costs in America radically. 
If housing costs in the United States are so low, why the 
horror stories? What about the tear-downs going for millions 
in Palo Alto? What about the multi-million-dollar apartments 
in Manhattan? The American Housing Survey allows us to see 
the distribution of house prices across the country. In addition, 
this source improves on the census by providing much better 
information on housing characteristics. Thus, we can better 
compare the self-reported value of a house with the cost of 
building a home from scratch. When combined with the Means 
data, the American Housing Survey allows us to examine 
housing prices in a wide range of cities as well as the gap 
between these prices and new construction costs.  
These data suggest that America can be divided into three 
broad areas. First, there are a number of places where housing 
is priced far below the cost of new construction. These areas are 
primarily central cities in the Northeast and the Midwest, such 
as Detroit and Philadelphia. In these places, which were the 
subject of our previous work (Glaeser and Gyourko 2001), 
there is almost no new growth. In general, these places had 
significant housing price appreciation over the 1990s, but 
values are still below construction costs. 
In the second category of housing, in large areas of the 
country, costs are quite close to the cost of new construction. 
These places generally have robust growth on the edges of 
cities, where land is quite cheap. These areas represent the bulk 
of American housing, although they seem to be somewhat 
underrepresented in the AHS. 
Finally, there is a third category of cities and suburbs where 
the price of homes is much higher than the cost of new 
construction; Manhattan and Palo Alto are two examples. 
Indeed, many of these places are in California, but the 1990s 
saw an increase in such areas in the Northeast and South as 
well. Although there are a number of such places with 
extremely expensive homes, they do not represent the norm for 
America. Both poor and nonpoor people suffer from higher 
housing costs in such areas. 
In this paper, after first surveying housing costs in the 
United States, we examine why the expensive places have such 
high housing costs. High-cost places generally have either very 
attractive local amenities (great weather or good schools) or 
strong labor markets. The Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) 
framework has proved useful in such studies, and one of us 
(Gyourko and Tracy 1991) has written on this topic.
It is noteworthy that we do not focus here on the housing 
demand side of the cost equilibrium. Instead, we focus on the 
role of housing supply. What is it that creates places where the 
cost of housing is so much higher than the physical 
construction costs? We offer two basic views. First, there is the 
classic economics approach, which argues that houses are 
expensive because land is expensive. According to this view, 
there is a great deal of demand for certain areas, and land, by its 
very nature, is limited in supply. As such, the price of housing 
must rise. Traditional models, such as the classic Alonso-
Muth-Mills framework, take this view. FRBNY Economic Policy Review / June 2003 23
Our alternative view is that homes are expensive in high-
cost areas primarily because of government regulation, that is, 
zoning and other restrictions on building. According to this 
view, housing is expensive because of artificial limits on 
construction created by the regulation of new housing. It 
argues that there is plenty of land in high-cost areas, and in 
principle new construction might be able to push the cost of 
houses down to physical construction costs. This is not to 
imply that high prices exist in areas with weak demand 
fundamentals. A strong demand, because of attractive 
amenities or a thriving labor market, is essential. However, this 
hypothesis implies that land prices are high, not due to some 
intrinsic scarcity, but because of man-made regulations. 
Hence, the barriers to building create a potentially massive 
wedge between prices and building costs.
We present three pieces of evidence that attempt to 
differentiate between these two hypotheses. First, we look at 
two different ways of valuing land. The first, classic way, is to 
use a housing hedonic and compare the price of comparable 
homes situated on lots of different sizes. With these 
comparisons, we are, in principle, able to back out the value 
that consumers place on larger lots. Our second methodology 
is to subtract the construction costs from the home value and 
divide by the number of acres. This gives us another per-acre 
value of land that is implied by the home price. The first, or 
hedonic, methodology can be thought of as giving the intensive 
value of land—that is, how much land is worth on the margin 
to homeowners. The second methodology gives the extensive 
margin—or how much it is worth to have a plot of land with a 
house on it.
The two hypotheses outlined above offer radically different 
predictions about the relationship of these two values. The 
neoclassical approach suggests that land should be valued the 
same using either methodology.  After all, if a homeowner does 
not value the land on his plot very much, he would subdivide 
and sell it to someone else. The regulation approach suggests 
that the differences can be quite large. Empirically, we find that 
the hedonic estimates produce land values that often are about 
10 percent of the values calculated with the extensive method- 
ology. We believe that this is our best evidence for the critical 
role that building limitations may play in creating high housing 
costs.
Our second empirical approach is to look at crowding in 
high-cost areas. The neoclassical approach tells us that if these 
are areas with a high cost of land, then individuals should be 
consuming less land. The regulation approach argues that 
highly regulated areas will have large lots and high prices. Our 
evidence suggests that there is little connection across areas 
between high prices and density. This again is consistent with a 
critical role for regulation.
Our third approach is to correlate measures of regulation 
with the value of housing prices. This approach is somewhat 
problematic because high values of land may themselves create 
regulation. Nonetheless, we find a robust connection between 
high prices and regulation. Almost all of the very high-cost 
areas are extremely regulated—even though they have fairly 
reasonable density levels. Again, we interpret this as evidence of 
the importance of regulation.
As a whole, our paper concludes that America does not 
uniformly face a housing affordability crisis. In the majority of 
places, land costs are low (or at least reasonable) and housing 
prices are close to (or below) the costs of new construction. In 
the places where housing is quite expensive, building 
restrictions appear to have created these high prices.  
One implication of this analysis is that the affordable 
housing debate should be broadened to encompass zoning 
reform, not just public or subsidized construction programs. 
Although poor households almost certainly are not consuming 
the typical unit in areas with extremely high prices, we suspect 
that most filtering models of housing markets would show that 
they too would benefit from an increased focus on land-use 
constraints by affordability advocates.
That said, we have done nothing to assess the possible 
benefits of zoning (well discussed by Fischel [1992], for 
example). So we cannot suggest that zoning should be 
eliminated. However, we believe that the evidence suggests that 
zoning is responsible for high housing costs, which means that 
if we are thinking about lowering housing prices, we should 
begin with reforming the barriers to new construction in the 
private sector. 
2. Housing Prices in the 
United States
We start with an analysis of housing prices across the United 
States. This work follows the methodology of Glaeser and 
Gyourko (2001). In this paper, we use the American Housing 
Survey and the U.S. census to gather data on housing 
characteristics and values; we use the R.S. Means data for 
construction costs. We then create measures relating home 
prices to construction costs. 
R.S. Means monitors construction costs in numerous 
American and Canadian cities. The Means Company reports 
local construction costs per square foot of living area. Its data 24 The Impact of Building Restrictions on Housing Affordability
on construction costs include material costs, labor costs, and 
equipment costs for four different quality types of single-unit 
residences. No land costs are included.4  
The Means data contain information on four quality types 
of homes—economy, average, custom, and luxury. The data 
are broken down further by the size of living area (ranging from 
600 to 3,200 square feet), the number of stories in the unit, and 
a few other differentiators. We focus on costs for a one-story, 
economy house with an unfinished basement, with the mean 
cost associated with four possible types of siding and building 
frame, and with small (less than 1,550 square feet), medium 
(1,550 to 1,850 square feet), or large (1,850 to 2,500 square feet) 
living areas. Generally, our choices reflect low to modest 
construction costs. This strategy will tend to overestimate the 
true gap between housing prices and construction costs.  If the 
relevant benchmark is an average-quality unit, not an 
economy-quality unit, construction costs should generally be 
increased by about 20 percent. 
The housing price data used in this paper to create the 
relationship between home prices and construction costs come 
from the American Housing Survey. We focus on observations 
of single-unit residences that are owner-occupied and exclude 
condominiums and cooperative units in buildings with 
multiple units, even if they are owned.
Excluding apartments simplifies our analysis, but in some 
ways the connection between construction costs and home 
prices is easier with apartments. In general, the marginal 
construction cost of an apartment is the price of building up. 
For example, other data from R.S. Means show that the price 
per square foot of building in a typical high-rise of from eight 
to twenty-four stories was nearly $110 per square foot in New 
York City in 1999.5 This implies that the purely physical costs 
of construction for a new 1,500-square-foot unit in New York 
City are about $166,500. Anyone familiar with the New York 
housing market knows that a large number of Manhattan 
apartments trade at many multiples of this amount. 
Because house price will be compared with construction 
costs, and the latter are reported on a square-foot basis, the 
house price data must be put in similar form. This is 
straightforward for the AHS, which contains the square footage 
of living areas. For every single unit reported in the 1999 or 
1989 AHS, we can then compute the ratio of house value to 
construction costs (as long as it is in an area tracked in the 
Means data).6 From this, we can calculate the distribution of 
homes priced above and below construction costs and can do 
so for nearly forty cities in both 1989 and 1999.  We look at two 
measures: the first is the share of housing in the area that costs 
at least 40 percent more than new construction. These are the 
homes in the area where land is actually a significant share of 
new construction costs. If the appropriate benchmark is an 
economy home, then for these homes land is about 40 percent 
or more of the value. If the appropriate benchmark is an 
average home, then for these homes land is approximately 
20 percent of the value of the home. Our view is that homes 
below this cutoff are sitting on relatively cheap land. We also 
calculate the share of homes with prices that are more than 
10 percent below the cost of new construction.  
Table 1 shows the distribution of homes—relative to 
construction costs—for the nation as a whole and for the four 
main census regions. These data highlight the point that at least 
half of the nation’s housing is less than 40 percent more 
expensive than economy-quality home construction costs, or 
no more than 20 percent more expensive than average-quality 
home construction costs. They also suggest that a large share of 
the nation’s housing has its price determined roughly by the 
physical costs of new construction, as most of the housing value 
is within 40 percent of physical construction costs. That said, 
the regional breakdowns reported in Table 1 emphasize that 
much land in Western cities looks to be relatively expensive.  
Charts 1 and 2 give an overall impression of the underlying 
data. In Chart 1, for central cities, we have graphed the share of 
homes with prices that are more than 40 percent above 
construction costs in the 1999 American Housing Survey on 
the share of comparable homes in the 1989 AHS. The straight 
line in the chart is the 45-degree line.  In Chart 2, we have 
repeated this procedure for the suburban parts of the 
metropolitan areas. 
Table 1
Distribution of Single-Family House Prices Relative 
to Construction Costs
























140 Percent of 
Construction 
Costs
Nation 0.17 0.46 0.17 0.50
Midwest 0.41 0.14 0.30 0.27
Northeast 0.12 0.58 0.37 0.34
South 0.11 0.50 0.13 0.46
West 0.05 0.69 0.04 0.77
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Chart 1
House Prices/Construction Costs over Time
Central Cities
Note: The x-axis (y-axis) denotes the share of homes in central cities with prices that are more than 40 percent above construction costs in the 1999 
(1989) American Housing Survey.
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Chart 1 makes two major points. First, there is a great deal 
of permanence in these measures. The correlation coefficient 
between the 1989 and 1999 measures is 82 percent. The average 
of this variable across central cities was 47.8 percent in 1989 
and 50.2 percent in 1999, so it does not look like the 1990s were 
a watershed in terms of housing price changes. Second, there is a 
great deal of heterogeneity across places. A number of places—
primarily in California—have almost no homes that cost less 
than 1.4 times construction costs. However, in a number of 
places, almost all of the homes cost less than this benchmark. 
Chart 2 makes similar points. The correlation between the 
1989 and 1999 measures is lower, but remains high at 0.70. 
There is also heterogeneity across space in suburban areas, 
but in general these places are more likely to have land values 
that are substantially higher than construction costs. The 
unweighted mean across the thirty-seven suburban areas was 26 The Impact of Building Restrictions on Housing Affordability
Chart 2
House Prices/Construction Costs over Time
Suburban Areas
Note: The x-axis (y-axis) denotes the share of homes in suburban areas with prices that are more than 40 percent above construction costs in the 1999 
(1989) American Housing Survey.




















































61 percent in 1989 and 63 percent in 1999. We suspect that one 
reason for the higher fractions of expensive housing is that 
suburban homes are newer and are likely to be of high quality. 
A second reason is that suburban homes have more land and 
suburban land is more expensive.
The data by local area are shown in Tables 2 and 3. These 
tables also report the share of the housing stock that is priced at 
least 10 percent below construction costs. Across the United 
States, there are many areas with extremely cheap housing. 
However, in this sample, only Philadelphia and Detroit had 
extremely large values of this measure in 1999.7 We should note 
that our previous work using the 1990 census suggests that 
there is a greater amount of cheaper housing than is indicated 
by the AHS. Our suspicion is that the census is more 
representative, but we leave further examination of these 
discrepancies to future work. FRBNY Economic Policy Review / June 2003 27
Table 2
Distribution of House Prices/Construction Costs 
























140 Percent of 
Construction 
Costs
Albuquerque 0.02 0.82 0.03 0.83
Anaheim 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.93
Austin 0.00 0.46 0.06 0.71
Baltimore 0.18 0.41 0.30 0.27
Chicago 0.20 0.28 0.16 0.44
Columbus 0.33 0.18 0.12 0.29
Dallas 0.06 0.56 0.13 0.47
Denver 0.04 0.60 0.08 0.86
Detroit 0.85 0.05 0.54 0.20
El Paso 0.05 0.34 0.02 0.28
Fort Worth 0.12 0.40 0.26 0.29
Greensboro 0.13 0.59 0.00 0.69
Houston 0.25 0.40 0.25 0.27
Indianapolis 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.22
Jacksonville 0.08 0.55 0.11 0.43
Kansas City 0.33 0.09 0.40 0.12
Las Vegas 0.00 0.29 0.03 0.45
Little Rock 0.09 0.36 0.08 0.40
Los Angeles 0.02 0.93 0.04 0.89
Milwaukee 0.32 0.10 0.27 0.22
Minneapolis 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.30
Nashville-
  Davidson 0.02 0.69 0.05 0.56
New Orleans 0.02 0.49 0.03 0.57
New York City 0.04 0.81 0.11 0.56
Norfolk 0.01 0.87 0.02 0.66
Oklahoma
  City 0.13 0.30 0.16 0.41
Omaha 0.21 0.15 0.30 0.21
Philadelphia 0.10 0.52 0.60 0.16
Phoenix 0.02 0.69 0.05 0.65
Raleigh 0.06 0.81 0.02 0.81
Sacramento 0.00 0.55 0.03 0.72
San Antonio 0.12 0.48 0.30 0.26
San Diego 0.07 0.88 0.03 0.93
San Francisco 0.00 0.97 0.04 0.96
Seattle 0.06 0.49 0.02 0.86
Tampa 0.09 0.43 0.13 0.49
Toledo 0.27 0.16 0.40 0.23
Tucson 0.06 0.43 0.04 0.61
Tulsa 0.07 0.36 0.08 0.38
Wichita 0.18 0.21 0.13 0.48
Table 3
Distribution of House Prices/Construction Costs
























140 Percent of 
Construction 
Costs
Albany 0.06 0.63 0.00 0.40
Anaheim 0.02 0.96 0.03 0.96
Atlanta 0.03 0.67 0.06 0.58
Baltimore 0.05 0.66 0.01 0.61
Birmingham 0.10 0.56 0.12 0.53
Boston 0.01 0.87 0.02 0.86
Chicago 0.06 0.67 0.05 0.74
Cincinnati 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.47
Cleveland 0.15 0.23 0.05 0.58
Columbus 0.12 0.47 0.03 0.61
Dallas 0.03 0.58 0.06 0.52
Detroit 0.24 0.26 0.08 0.58
Fort 
  Lauderdale 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.85
Fort Worth 0.09 0.59 0.09 0.49
Houston 0.23 0.24 0.08 0.31
Kansas City 0.15 0.22 0.05 0.33
Los Angeles 0.04 0.91 0.04 0.89
Miami 0.05 0.72 0.00 0.73
Milwaukee 0.05 0.39 0.08 0.53
Minneapolis 0.08 0.29 0.05 0.43
Newark 0.01 0.96 0.01 0.72
New Orleans 0.10 0.53 0.06 0.61
New York City 0.03 0.85 0.09 0.78
Orlando 0.03 0.70 0.04 0.61
Oxnard 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.93
Philadelphia 0.03 0.78 0.11 0.47
Phoenix 0.02 0.65 0.00 0.76
Pittsburgh 0.23 0.19 0.25 0.21
Riverside 0.05 0.87 0.02 0.76
Rochester 0.01 0.63 0.09 0.28
Sacramento 0.03 0.83 0.05 0.72
Salt Lake City 0.10 0.22 0.02 0.86
San Diego 0.04 0.92 0.05 0.88
San Francisco 0.01 0.98 0.02 0.97
Seattle 0.02 0.72 0.01 0.90
St. Louis 0.11 0.34 0.21 0.34
Tampa 0.03 0.57 0.05 0.6628 The Impact of Building Restrictions on Housing Affordability
Our focus here is not on the cheap areas, however, but on 
the expensive ones. Moreover, we believe that these data 
confirm that there are some areas of the country that do indeed 
have a dearth of affordable housing. Still, for much of the 
country, prices are determined by new construction costs. 
As we discussed, this means that there is not an affordable 
housing crisis in such areas. The problem probably lies in the 
labor market, not the land market. We now consider why home 
prices are high relative to construction costs in the areas that 
are expensive.
3. Discussion: Demand for Land 
versus Zoning
Housing prices are determined by both demand and supply 
concerns. High housing prices must reflect high consumer 
demand for a particular area. However, they must also reflect 
some sort of restriction on supply. Data from sources such as 
Means suggest that physical houses can be supplied almost 
perfectly elastically. As such, the limits on housing supply must 
come from the land component of housing. The usual urban 
economics view of housing markets suggests that the 
restriction on housing supply is the availability of land. Because 
land is ultimately inelastically supplied, this naturally creates a 
limit on the supply of new housing at construction costs. An 
alternative view is that land itself is fairly abundant, but zoning 
authorities make new construction extremely costly. These 
costs can take the form of classic impact fees or Byzantine 
approval processes that slow or put up costly hurdles to 
construction. Obviously, there could be some truth to both 
views. In this section, we provide an analytical framework for 
our attempts to distinguish empirically between the two views 
of expensive land: intrinsic scarcity versus zoning. Section 4 
then examines a variety of data to determine if the weight of the 
evidence more strongly supports one view over the other.
As noted, we have decided to ignore the housing demand 
component of the housing prices. Two reasons underpin this 
decision. First, housing demand has been studied much more 
extensively than housing supply. A distinguished literature, 
including Alonso (1964), Muth (1969), Rosen (1979), and 
Roback (1982), has considered the determinants of housing 
demand. Labor market demand and consumption amenities, 
such as weather and schools, are both important causes of 
particular demand for some areas. We have little to add to these 
findings. Second, policy responses to housing prices are 
unlikely to change housing demand. Increasing supply is a 
much more natural policy response to high housing prices than 
is reducing demand. 
To clarify the issues, let us consider a jurisdiction with a 
supply of land equal to A. Assume that the construction cost for 
a home is K. Here we are not interested in the margin of 
interior space. The free market price of land equals p. We 
represent zoning and other building restrictions with a tax T on 
new construction. In principle, zoning could also work by 
limiting the total number of homes in the area to a fixed 
number or, equivalently, by constraining lot size to be greater 
than a given amount. As we assume homogenous residents, a 
minimum lot size and a constraint on the number of residents 
will be equivalent. Also, as we are not interested in the 
incidence of the policy, a tax and a quantity limit will yield the 
same outcomes.  
As such, the supply price of building a house with L units of 
land will be  . We will not generally directly observe 
either   or  . The sales price of the home will be denoted 
, where   refers to the price of a home with   units 
of land. In equilibrium,   must equal   so 
.  
Our primary interest is in the relevant magnitudes of   
and   in creating expensive housing. We do not directly 
observe either   or  , but we do observe   and  . As such, 
we can compute  , which gives us an estimate of 
. Using standard hedonic analysis, we can estimate 
, which is the amount the housing price increases within 
a given neighborhood as the amount of land rises. By 
estimating  , we are estimating  —the implicit price of 
land. Even in communities where new houses are not being 
built, the hedonic value of land still gives us an implicit price of 
land. We can then compare   with  , which 
equals  . The difference between these two values gives 
us a sense of the relative importance of land prices and building 
restrictions.  
A second test of the model requires us to look across 
communities with different levels of some local amenity that we 
denote as  . In this case, we write the home price function as 
. If we differentiate across communities and   changes 
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The value of   might differ across communities because 
impact fees differ, but more likely   will differ if zoning takes 
the form of quantity controls. If zoning takes the form of mini-
mum lot size or maximum residents, then the implicit tax will 
be higher in high-amenity communities. In a sense, our interest 
T
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One way to examine this is to look at our implied measures of 
 and   found using the methodology discussed above. 
Another way is to look at land densities. We specify utility as 
a function of the location-specific amenity  , consumption of 
land, and consumption of a composite commodity, denoted  , 
which is equal to income (denoted  ) minus housing costs. Thus, 
total utility equals  . This implies an optimal 
level of land, denoted  , which satisfies   
(where   denotes the derivative of  (.,.,.) with respect 
to an argument  ).  For simplicity, we assume that 
 equals  , 
so the first-order condition for land becomes  . 
Differentiating this with respect to   then yields 
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clear implication that if   is big, we should expect there 
to be lower densities in areas with large amenities and high 
costs. Conversely, if there is no connection between housing 
costs and density, then this is more evidence for the zoning 
model rather than the neoclassical housing price model.
Our third empirical approach relies on the existence of 
zoning. If we have measures of the difficulty of obtaining 
building permits in a particular area, then we should expect 
them to drive up housing costs (holding   constant). This is 
just documenting that   > 0. Obviously, this approach is 
likely to be compromised if high-amenity areas impose more 
stringent zoning. Nonetheless, a connection between the 
strength of zoning rules and housing prices seems like a final 
test for the zoning view. As an added test, if we have measures 
of zoning controls across communities, we would expect the 
estimated value of   to be higher. 
4. Evidence on Zoning: The 
Intensive Margin and 
the Extensive Margin
As our first test, we follow the framework and attempt to 
estimate p: the market price of land, and  : the implicit 
zoning tax. Using data from the 1999 American Housing 
Survey, we begin by estimating   using the standard hedonic 
methodology in a regression of the following specification:
(1)    housing price =  land area + other controls.
The other controls include the number of bedrooms, the 








indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the home has a 
fireplace, an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the 
home has a garage, an indicator variable that takes on a value of 
1 if the home is in a central city, an indicator variable that takes 
on a value of 1 if the home has a basement, an indicator variable 
that takes on a value of 1 if the home has air conditioning, and 
the age of the home. We ran each regression separately for 
26 metropolitan areas for which there were 100 observations 
so that trait prices would reasonably be precisely 
estimated.8  
Column 1 of Table 4 reports the hedonic price of land for 
different metropolitan areas using this linear specification. The 
hedonic literature has generally argued that non-normal error 
terms make a logarithmic specification more sensible. As such, 
we have also estimated logarithmic equations of the following 
form:
()   log(home price) =   log(land area) + other controls.
To transform the estimate of  , which is an elasticity, into 
a value of land, we take this coefficient and multiply it by the 
ratio of mean home price to mean land area. After this 
transformation, our elasticity-based estimates should be 
comparable to those in column 1, and we report them in 
column 2.
The two hedonic estimates are strongly correlated (  = .5), 
although the implicit prices arising from the logged 
specification tend to be slightly higher. In any event, functional 
form does not lead one to materially different conclusions 
regarding the value of a small change in lot size about the 
sample mean in these areas. In general, the hedonic estimates 
suggest that land is relatively cheap on this margin. In some 
cities, the estimated price is below $1 per square foot. Although 
estimates in those places tend not to be precise, the t-statistics 
reported still do not imply really high prices, even at the top 
end of the 95 percent confidence interval. In places where the 
point estimate is reasonably precise, land prices tend to be 
between $1 and $2 per square foot. In these areas, this implies 
that an average homeowner would be willing to pay between 
$11,000 and $22,000 for an extra quarter-acre of land.9 The 
estimates are higher in some cities, primarily in California. For 
example, in San Francisco, it appears that homeowners are 
willing to pay almost $80,000 for an extra quarter-acre of 
land.10 Although we do not have very good benchmarks against 
which to compare these prices, intuitively they seem reasonable 
to us as a whole.
To implement our first test, we must compare these prices 
with the implicit price of land found by computing the 
1′ p′ ∗
p′
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Table 4
Land Price on the Extensive and Intensive Margins
City
Hedonic Price of 
Land/Square Foot, 
Linear Specification
Hedonic Price of Land/Square 
Foot, Log-Log Specification
Imputed Land Cost from 
R.S. Means Company Data
(Intensive Margin) Mean House Price
Anaheim $2.89 $3.55 $38.99 $312,312
(1.54) (1.34)
Atlanta $0.23 -$0.30 $3.20 $150,027
(0.50) (-0.70)
Baltimore $1.15 $5.21 $4.43 $152,813
(2.53) (2.31)
Boston $0.07 $0.55 $13.16 $250,897
(0.10) (0.67)
Chicago $0.79 $0.80 $14.57 $184,249
(2.43) (1.96)
Cincinnati $0.89 $0.50 $2.71 $114,083
(1.92) (1.14)
Cleveland $0.26 $0.24 $4.13 $128,127
(0.95) (0.81)
Dallas -$0.83 $0.21 $5.42 $117,805
(-1.14) (0.27)
Detroit $0.14 $0.45 $5.10 $138,217
(0.92) (2.31)
Houston $1.43 $1.62 $4.37 $108,463
(2.61) (2.66)
Kansas City $2.06 $1.65 $1.92 $112,700
(2.75) (2.11)
Los Angeles $2.19 $2.60 $30.44 $254,221
(4.63) (3.53)
Miami $0.37 $0.18 $10.87 $153,041
(0.45) (0.24)
Milwaukee $1.44 $0.95 $3.04 $130,451
(3.08) (1.90)
Minneapolis $0.29 $0.35 $8.81 $149,267
(0.93) (1.09)
Newark $0.42 $0.10 $17.70 $231,312
(0.62) (0.11)
New York City $0.84 $1.62 $32.33 $252,743
(1.09) (1.60)
Philadelphia $1.07 $0.77 $3.20 $163,615
(6.41) (5.28)
Phoenix $1.89 $1.86 $6.86 $143,296
(3.88) (3.26)
Pittsburgh $2.28 $1.71 $3.08 $106,747
(6.26) (4.55)
Riverside $1.35 $1.60 $7.92 $149,819
(3.55) (2.95)
San Diego $0.58 $1.29 $26.12 $245,764
(0.97) (1.33)
San Francisco $0.97 $7.84 $63.72 $461,209
(0.76) (2.42)
Seattle -$0.68 $0.48 $18.91 $262,676
(-0.69) (0.06)
St. Louis $0.63 $0.07 $1.74 $110,335
(1.91) (1.55)
Tampa $0.19 $0.89 $6.32 $101,593
(0.36) (1.30)
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difference between home prices and structure costs. 
Subtracting structure costs (provided by the Means data) from 
reported home values and then dividing by the amount of land 
generates an estimate of  , as described above—the 
value of land including the implicit tax on new construction. 
These average values of   for each metropolitan area 
appear in column 3 of Table 4.
Comparing columns 1 and 2 with column 3 illustrates the 
vast differences in our estimates of the intensive and extensive 
prices of land, or   and  . In many cases, our estimate 
of   is about ten times larger than  . For example, in 
Chicago, our imputed price of land per square foot from the 
extensive margin methodology is $14.57. This means that a 
home on a quarter-acre plot (or 10,890 square feet) will cost 
more than $140,000 above construction costs. In San Diego, this 
quarter-acre plot is implicitly priced at nearly $285,000. The 
analogous figure is even higher in New York City, at slightly 
more than $350,000. In San Francisco, the plot is apparently 
worth just under $700,000. 
This is our first piece of evidence on the relative importance 
of classic land prices and zoning. In areas where the ratio is 
10:1, the findings suggest that for an average lot, only 10 per-
cent of the value of the land comes from an intrinsically high 
land price as measured by hedonic prices.11 
Although the hedonic land prices from the linear 
specification (column 1) are not significantly correlated with 
the mean house prices reported in column 4 of Table 4, both 
the hedonic prices from the logged model (column 2) and the 
extensive margin prices (column 3) are strongly positively 
correlated with mean prices. Simple regressions of each of the 
three land price series on mean house price find that the dollar 
impact of house price with respect to land price is far larger for 
the series that reflects the implicit development tax. Specifi-
cally, a one-standard-deviation increase in house price (which 
equals $82,239 in this twenty-six-city sample) above its mean is 
associated with a $13.82 increase in land price as reflected in 
our   measure. The analogous standardized effect with 
respect to our measure of   arising from the logged hedonic 
model is $1.10.12 Although these results are based on an 
admittedly small sample, we believe that the difference in the 
scale of the changes provides evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that high home prices appear to have more to do 
with regulation than with the operations of a free market 
for land. 
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5. Evidence on Zoning: Density 
and Housing Costs 
Our second test is to look at the connection between housing 
prices and density. As described in the model, the neoclassical 
land model strongly suggests that there should be a positive 
connection between density and housing prices. The free land 
market view suggests that higher amenities will lead to higher 
land prices and lower consumption of land. The zoning view 
suggests that higher amenities will just lead to a higher implicit 
zoning tax. This zoning tax does not impact the marginal cost 
of additional land and there should therefore be little 
connection between the cost of land and density.
To test this implication, we correlate land density within a 
central city with our various measures of housing prices within 
that city. Because the framework suggested the relationship 
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equation. We use as our land area measure the logarithm of the 
land area in the city divided by the number of households.13 
Obviously, density is higher the lower the value of this variable. 
Table 5 presents the results from a series of regressions 
exploring the relationship of our density measure with the 
index of expensive homes and land in our sample of cities. In 
regression 1, we use as the independent variable our measure of 
the share of houses that cost at least 40 percent more than 
construction does. In this case, the relationship is negative, so a 
higher concentration of expensive homes is associated with 
greater density. However, there still is no meaningful statistical 
relationship. Chart 3 plots the relationship with the regression 
line included. The chart highlights the extraordinary amount of 
heterogeneity in the relationship between density and the 
distribution of house prices. For example, Detroit, Seattle, and 
Los Angeles have similar land densities per household, but 
radically different fractions of units sitting on expensive land. 
Analogously, New York City and San Diego have similarly high 
fractions of expensive land, but very different residential 
densities.
In regression 2, we control for median income in the city in 
1990 to help account for the possibility that richer people live 
in expensive areas and demand more land. However, there still 
is no really strong relationship between density and the fraction 
of expensive land and homes. Density is slightly higher in more 
expensive areas on average, but the relationship is tenuous even 
when controlling for income. In regression 3, median house 
price in 1990 is used as the independent variable. There is a 
statistically significant negative relationship between density 
and price in this case, with the elasticity being -0.56. However, 
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regarding Detroit, Seattle, Los Angeles, New York City, and 
San Diego still hold true when median price is on the right-
hand side of the regression.    
For regressions 4, 5, and 6, we take the model more seriously 
and use an amenity to look at the impact of housing costs and 
land consumption. We focus on a particularly well-studied 
amenity—average January temperature. In regression 4, we 
show that there is a strong positive relationship between the 
fraction of expensive homes and land and average January 
temperature. This relationship is necessary for this variable to 
qualify as an instrument. In regression 5, we regress the 
logarithm of land area per household on January temperature. 
In this case, the relationship is much less strong statistically. 
The t-statistic is 1.6. Taken together, these results show that a 
warmer January temperature may raise housing prices,14 but 
there is no strong evidence that it increases densities—at least 
not by very much. Indirectly, this suggests that it is not raising 
the marginal cost of land by much.
In regression 6, we follow the spirit of the framework most 
closely. We regress the logarithm of land area per household on 
the distribution of housing prices using average January 
temperature as an instrument. January temperature is meant to 
represent the exogenous variation in amenities that causes 
prices to rise. Not only is there no statistically meaningful 
connection between prices and land consumption, but these 
instrumental-variables results imply that higher prices are 
associated with lower, not higher, densities. One possibility is 
that incomes are higher in these areas and that richer people are 
demanding more land. Consequently, we redid the analysis 
adding median family income as a control, but the results were 
largely unchanged. That is, there is no statistically significant 
relation between instrumented prices and density, and the 
point estimate still is slightly positive (albeit small). Although 
we acknowledge that the sample is small and that there could 
be other omitted factors, these results suggest to us that higher 
prices have more to do with zoning than a higher marginal cost 
of land. 
As a final test of this view, we regress our two measures of 
land costs from Table 4 with average January temperature. We 
only have twenty-six observations, but the results are still quite 
Table 5
Density and the Distribution of House Prices in Cities, 1990
Dependent Variable
Log Land Area  
per Household
Log  Land Area 
per Household
 Log Land Area 
per Household
Fraction of Units
Valued at or above
140 Percent
of Construction Costs
 Log Land Area  
per Household
Log Land Area  
per Householda
Fraction of units valued at or above







Log median family income, 1989 0.266
(0.895)
Median house price, 1990 -0.565
(0.225)
Mean January temperature 0.013 0.015
(0.003) (0.009)
Intercept -7.050 -9.784 -0.959 -0.021 -7.882 -17.254
(0.245) (9.191) (2.536) (0.113) (0.387) (8.678)
0.01 -0.02 0.12 0.34 0.04
Number of observations 40 40 40 40 40 40
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Density is defined as the log of the ratio of square miles of land in the city divided by the number of households.
a Two-stage least squares: Mean January temperature as instrument.
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Chart 3
Density and the Distribution of House Prices
Central Cities, 1990
Note: The x-axis denotes the share of homes in central cities with prices that are more than 40 percent above construction costs in the 1989 American 
Housing Survey.



















































illuminating. A standard-deviation increase of 14.7 degrees in 
mean January temperature is associated with a $5.02 higher 
construction-cost-based price of land. The same increase in 
warmth is associated with only a $0.47 higher hedonic-based 
price of land.15 Once again, amenities seem to have more 
of an effect on the implicit zoning tax than on the marginal 
cost of land. 
6. Evidence on Zoning: Housing 
Costs and Zoning
Our last perspective on the role of zoning comes from an 
examination of the correlation between land prices and 
measures of zoning. Such data are very difficult to obtain. Our 
measures of zoning come from the Wharton Land Use Control 34 The Impact of Building Restrictions on Housing Affordability
Survey. This survey, which took place in 1989, covers 
jurisdictions in sixty metropolitan areas. Because of the 
limitations of our American Housing Survey data, we are 
forced to consider only observations on the central cities of 
forty-five metropolitan areas.
The variable we focus on here is a survey measure of the 
average length of time between an application for rezoning and 
the issuance of a building permit for a modest size, single-
family subdivision of fewer than fifty units. This measure can 
take on values ranging from 1 to 5: a value of 1 indicates the 
permit issuance lag is less than three months, a value of 2 
indicates the time frame is between three and six months, a 
value of 3 indicates a seven-to-twelve-month lag, a value of 
4 indicates the lag is between one and two years, and 5 indicates 
a very long lag of more than two years. Before proceeding to a 
regression, we note that the correlation of the permit length 
variable with the fraction of housing stock priced more than 
40 percent above the cost of new construction is fairly high at 
0.43. The mean fraction of high-cost housing among the cities 
with permit waiting times of at least six months (that is, a value 
of 3 or more for this variable) is 0.75. Difficult zoning seems to 
be ubiquitous in high-cost areas.16 
Table 6 reports regression results using the permit length 
variable. In the first column, we regress our housing cost 
measure (again using the share of the city’s housing stock 
priced more than 40 percent above the cost of new 
construction) on the first zoning measure—the time required 
to get a permit issued for a rezoning request. We find a strong 
positive relationship, so that when the index increases by one, 
15 percent more of the housing stock becomes quite expensive. 
This positive relationship also survives controlling for 
population growth during the 1980s and median income, as 
shown in the second column.17
In the final column of Table 6, we return to our implied 
zoning tax—T/L from above. This value is calculated using the 
data in Table 4. Specifically, we subtract the cost of land 
estimated in the nonlinear hedonic equation (that is, p from 
column 2 of Table 4) from the cost of land implied by sub-
tracting structure cost from total home value (that is, p+T/L 
from column 3 of Table 4). We then regress this variable on our 
zoning measure. As the results show, the implied zoning tax is 
strongly increasing in the length of time it takes to get a permit 
issued for a subdivision. Increasing a single category in terms of 
permit issuance lag is associated with a nearly $7 per-square-
foot increase in the implicit zoning tax. If the dependent 
variable is logged, the results imply that a one-unit increase in 
the index is associated with a 0.50-log-point increase in the 
implicit zoning tax.18 
Table 6
Zoning Regulations and the Distribution of House Prices
Dependent Variable
Fraction of Units Valued at or above 
140 Percent of Construction Costs
Fraction of Units Valued at or above
140 Percent of Construction Costs
T/L from Table 4
(Implied Zoning Tax)
Time to permit issuance for rezoning request 0.150 0.112 6.796
(0.051) (0.044) (3.048)
Log median family income, 1989 0.260
(0.255)
Percentage population growth, 1980-90 1.080
(0.411)
Intercept 0.111 -2.512 -3.527
(0.120) (2.634) (7.732)
0.16 0.40 0.15
Number of observations 40 40 22
Note: The independent zoning variable is a categorical measure of time lag between the application for rezoning and the issuance of a building permit 
for development of a modest size, single-family subdivision.
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7.  C o n c l u s i o n
America is not facing a nationwide affordable housing crisis. In 
most of the country, home prices appear to be fairly close to the 
physical costs of construction. In some of the country, home 
prices are even far below the physical costs of construction. 
Only in particular areas—especially New York City and 
California—do housing prices diverge substantially from the 
costs of new construction. 
In the areas where houses are expensive, the classic urban 
model fares relatively poorly. These areas are not generally 
characterized by substantially higher marginal costs of land, as 
estimated by a hedonic model. The hedonic results imply that 
the cost of a house on 10,000 square feet is usually pretty close 
in value to a house on 15,000 square feet. In addition, these 
high prices often are not associated with extremely high 
densities. For example, there is as much land per household in 
San Diego (a high-price area) as there is in Cleveland (a low-
price area). 
The bulk of the evidence marshaled in this paper suggests 
that zoning, and other land-use controls, are more responsible 
for high prices where we see them. There is a huge gap between 
the price of land implied by the gap between home prices and 
construction costs and the price of land implied by the price 
differences between homes on 10,000 square feet and homes on 
15,000 square feet. Measures of zoning strictness are highly 
correlated with high prices. Although all of our evidence is 
suggestive, not definitive, it seems to suggest that this form of 
government regulation is responsible for high housing costs 
where they exist.
We have not considered the benefits of zoning, which could 
certainly outweigh these costs. However, if policy advocates are 
interested in reducing housing costs, they would do well to start 
with zoning reform. Building small numbers of subsidized 
housing units is likely to have a trivial impact on average 
housing prices (given any reasonable demand elasticity), even 
if well targeted toward deserving poor households. However, 
reducing the implied zoning tax on new construction could 
well have a massive impact on housing prices.
The positive impact of zoning on housing prices may well be 
zoning’s strongest appeal. If we move to a regime with weaker 
zoning rules, then current homeowners in high-cost areas are 
likely to lose substantially. To make this politically feasible, it is 
crucial that any political reform also try to compensate the 
losers for this change. 36 The Impact of Building Restrictions on Housing Affordability
Appendix: Creation of the House Value/Construction Cost Ratio
A number of adjustments are made to the underlying house 
price data in the comparison of prices and construction costs. 
These include imputation of the square footage of living area 
for observations from the Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series for the 1980 and 1990 census years. However, because 
the results reported in this paper do not include census data, we 
omit the description of that imputation. See Glaeser and 
Gyourko (2001) for those details.
Two adjustments have been made to the American Housing 
Survey (AHS) house price data to account for the depreciation 
that occurs on older homes and to account for the fact that 
research shows that owners tend to overestimate the value of 
their homes. The remainder of this appendix provides the 
details. 
As noted, one adjustment takes into account the fact that 
research shows that owners tend to overestimate the value of 
their homes. Following the survey and recent estimation by 
Goodman and Ittner (1992), we presume that owners typically 
overvalue their homes by 6 percent.19
Empirically, the most important adjustment takes into 
account the fact that the vast majority of homes are not new 
and have experienced real depreciation. Depreciation factors 
are estimated using the AHS. More specifically, we regress 
house value per square foot (scaled down by the Goodman and 
Ittner [1992] correction) in the relevant year on a series of age 
controls and metropolitan area dummies. The age data are in 
interval form so that we can tell if a house is zero to five years 
old, six to ten years old, eleven to twenty-five years old, twenty-
five to thirty-six years old, and more than forty-five years old. 
The coefficients on the age controls are each negative, as 
expected, and represent the extent to which houses of different 
ages have depreciated in value on a per-square-foot basis.
Finally, we note that our procedure effectively assumes that 
units with a basement in the AHS have unfinished basements, 
so that we underestimate construction costs for units with 
finished basements. Having a basement adds materially to 
construction costs, according to data from R.S. Means 
Company. Depending on the size of the unit, those with 
unfinished basements have about 10 percent higher 
construction costs. Units with finished basements have up to 
30 percent higher construction costs, again depending on the 
size of the unit. After these adjustments have been made, house 
value is then compared with construction costs to produce the 
distributions reported in our paper.Endnotes
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1. This is not to say that housing vouchers might not be a sensible part 
of an antipoverty program. However, if housing is not expensive, then 
policies should be thought of as a response to poverty and not a 
response to a housing affordability crisis. 
2. Goodman and Ittner (1992) document that self-reported values tend 
to be about 7 percent higher than true sale prices.
3. Another relevant issue is change over time. The census reports a 
significant (15 percent) increase in the median value of a home over 
the 1990s. However, when we look at repeat-sales indices, which 
control for housing quality, we see much less of an increase over the 
1990s.
4. Two publications are particularly relevant for greater detail on the 
underlying data: R. S. Means Company’s Residential Cost Data, 19th 
ed., and Square Foot Costs, 21st ed.
5.  See R. S. Means Company (2002).
6. The actual computation is more complicated, as adjustments are 
made to correct for depreciation, inflation, the fact that owners tend 
to overestimate the value of their homes, and regional variation in the 
presence of basements. See the appendix for details. We also 
performed the analysis using the 1991 AHS; the results are virtually 
unchanged from 1989’s results.
7. The Philadelphia numbers for 1989 are not typos. They reflect a 
small sample bias associated with the number of units with basements. 
This is a statistical oddity that does not show up in other samples, 
whether in the AHS or decennial censuses.
8. There are only ninety-six observations in the Baltimore 
metropolitan area, which is the smallest number across all cities. 
Visual inspection of the findings found sensible results for most 
traits when the number of observations was at or above 100.
9. There are 43,560 square feet in an acre of land.
10. The estimate from the linear specification is much lower, but 
logging materially improves the overall hedonic in the case of 
San Francisco.
11. This ratio obviously is sensitive to biases in our hedonic estimates. 
We need to be concerned especially about the possibility that the 
quantity of land is correlated with price and (omitted) amenities. It is 
easy to construct examples in which the bias goes in opposite 
directions. For example, land undoubtedly costs different amounts in 
different parts of a given metropolitan area. Although our hedonic 
model includes a control for whether the observation is located within 
the central city of an area, this may only imperfectly capture a 
location-specific amenity that reflects, say, distance from a key 
employment node. Thus, people could be buying bigger lots in those 
parts of the metropolitan area with lower costs, and by not being able 
to control for this fully, our hedonic land price estimates will be biased 
downward.
That said, it is not at all clear that the net bias will be in that 
direction. We find it at least equally plausible that richer households, 
who tend to have larger lots, end up congregating in higher amenity 
(and higher price) areas. In this case, our estimated hedonic price of 
land would be biased upward. Although we cannot be certain what the 
net bias is, we find it highly unlikely that our estimates are so severely 
skewed downward that bias could account for the huge differential 
reported between land prices on the intensive and extensive margins. 
Our estimates would have to be off by an order of magnitude for that 
possibility to be relevant.
12. The coefficients are precisely estimated in the underlying 
regressions and are available upon request. Because the hedonic land 
price arising from the linear model is virtually uncorrelated with mean 
house price, the analogous impact is near zero for that land price 
series. 
13. Using population per square mile yields similar results.
14. There is a statistically and economically significant positive 
relationship between mean January temperature and median house 
price. Those results are not reported here, but are available from the 
authors upon request.
15. We use the price series from the nonlinear hedonic in the 
underlying regression. Only the regression involving the construction-
based land prices (column 3 of Table 4) yields statistically significant 
results at conventional levels. 
16. Other measures in the database include the analogue to this 
rezoning question, except that the permit length time applies to a 
completely new subdivision that does not require rezoning. We 
examined this and other variables and found correlation patterns 
similar to those presented below.38 The Impact of Building Restrictions on Housing Affordability 
Endnotes (Continued)
17. Adding region dummies to the specification eliminates any 
significant positive correlation between this zoning control and the 
fraction of expensive housing in the area.
18. Finally, similar results are obtained if other approval-time 
variables are used (such as those for a new subdivision).
19. This effect turns out to be relatively minor in terms of its 
quantitative impact on the results.References
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